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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

Case No.

s

ERLENE KAY STRIEBY,

:

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the majority decision of the Court of Appeals
erroneously determined that there was no evidence to support the
trial court's findings of fact upon which defendant's conviction
was based; that is, whether that decision so far departed from a
proper application of the standard of review for bench trials
that this Court should exercise its supervisory authority and
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

See Utah R. App.

P. 46(c).
OPINION BELOW
State v. Strieby, No. 890124-CA (Utah Ct. App. March
30, 1990) (see Addendum A for the text of the decision).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals which reversed defendant's conviction for
manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code

Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989), in a decision entered March 30,
1990.

No petition for rehearing was filed.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
SS 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and 78-2a-4 (1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS
Defendant, Erlene Kay Strieby, was charged with second
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 2-3).
Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense
of manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989), on November 30, 1988,
following a bench trial, in the Third Judicial District Court for
Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
Judge, presiding (R. at 86). Defendant was sentenced by Judge
Rigtrup on January 9, 1989, to a term of one to fifteen years at
the Utah State Prison, and ordered to pay restitution in an
amount to be determined by the Board of Pardons at the time of
release (R. at 86). On January 18, 1989, defendant filed a
motion for new trial (R. at 87-88).

On February 8, 1989, the

motion was denied (R. at 114-116).
On appeal, the conviction was reversed in State v.
Strieby, No. 890124-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 30, 1990).
decision, two members of the panel concluded:
The [trial] court agreed with the prosecution
that Chris [the victim] went into the kitchen
-2-

In that

and poured something to drink before
following defendant upstairs. This
conclusion is not supported by any evidence
in the trial record; it is merely the
prosecution's supposition. A court may not
"'make speculative leap[s] across . . .
remaining gap[sj' in the evidence."
Striebyf slip op. at 6 (citing State v. Harmanf 767 P.2d 567, 568
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), quoting State fr. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445
(Utah 1983)).
At trial, the evidence, much of it from the defendant
herself, revolved around an ongoing fight between defendant and
her husband, Chris Strieby.

On July 7, 1988, defendant and Mr.

Strieby "got into a heated argument over sex" (R. 137 at 230).
The next day, defendant returned from her job in Grantsville and,
after some time at the Striebys' home, went to the welding shop
where Mr. Strieby worked (R. 137 at 232-33).

There defendant

confronted Mr. Strieby, then left and went to a local club and
drank "about four mini bottles" of alcoholic beverages (R. 136 at
47-48 and R. 137 at 233-34).

Defendant returned to the trailer

at which Mr. Strieby's father lived, next to the welding shop,
and again confronted her husband (R. 136 at 50-55, 68, and 7479).

Mr. Strieby had also been drinking at this point (R. 136 at

72).

Witnesses testified that defendant "lunged" at the victim

and tried to hit him and they wrestled and fell to the floor (R.
136 at 52-54 and 74-79).

Mr. Strieby held defendant down on the

floor until she "calmed down enough," then let her get to her
feet (R. 136 at 54). Defendant told Mr. Strieby that "as soon as
she got her hands on a gun, he was a dead SOB" (R. 136 at 79).

--*-

Defendant returned to the Strieby home and sent Mr.
Strieby's nephew to give Mr. Strieby a ride home (R. 136 at 106108).

The nephew dropped Mr. Strieby at the home and left at

about 6:30 p.m. (R. 136 at 109-111).

At 6:38 p.m. the Tooele

County Sheriff's Office received a report of a shooting at the
Strieby residence (R. 136 at 18). Only defendant's statements
recite what occurred between the time that Mr. Strieby's nephew
left and the time that defendant walked out of the home and to a
neighbor's house and asked them to call the sheriff.
Defendant gave the deputy sheriff a statement the night
of the shooting, stating that Mr. Strieby had threatened her,
told her to get the gun, and told her that the gun was not loaded
(State's Exhibit [hereinafter St. Exh.] #14 at 2-3). She told
the deputy that she was upset, went and got the gun, and shot Mr.
Strieby.

She also stated that the gun was loaded even though she

had thought that it was not (St. Exh. #14 at 4 and 8).
According to defendant's trial testimony, the following
occurred.

Mr. Strieby arrived home, and he and defendant began

pushing and shoving each other (R. 137 at 240). Defendant tried
to go out the door and Mr. Strieby slammed it shut (R. 137 at
241).

Defendant then pushed Mr. Strieby and ran up the stairs,

but he pulled her back down (R. 137 at 241). She "[p]ushed him
up against the wall" (R. 137 at 242), causing Mr. Strieby to lose
his balance:
I pushed him away, and he'd lose his balance.
He slid down the wall once. And when he got
up, he grabbed at me. And I kicked him in
the groin. I pushed him, and he went into
the kitchen.

-A-

(R. 137 at 243) (emphasis added).

When Mr. Strieby attempted to

strike her, she "moved, and he went clear to the stairs with his
fist" (R. 137 at 242). She got away from him a "couple of
times", being "faster than he was at the time to get away" (R.
137 at 263). Defendant then pushed Mr. Strieby once again, and
"he went into the kitchen . . . all this time telling me he was
going to kill me" (R. 137 at 243) (emphasis added).

She "got

away because he lost his balance a couple of times" (R. 137 at
262-263, 266, 268).X
Mr. Strieby broke off the confrontation and went into
the kitchen, and defendant ran upstairs (R. 137 at 242, 243, 245
and 267-68; see Addendum B for a copy of these record pages).
Mr. Strieby continued to yell threats and insults (R. 137 at
245).

Defendant could not recall where she obtained the weapon,

stating only "I know that I had the gun in my hands and was at
the top of the stairs when he was rounding the stairs to come up
the second flight" (R. 137 at 246). Defendant admitted that she
knew the gun was loaded (R. 137 at 271, 273). As Mr. Strieby
rounded the corner of the stairs, defendant fired a single shot,
striking him in the face and killing him instantly (R. 137 at
247).

Defendant then placed the gun on the bedroom nightstand

and went to the neighbors for help (R. 137 at 279).
After hearing this evidence, the trial court found
defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter

At trial, the state medical examiner testified that Mr.
Strieby's blood alcohol content at the time of his death was
.25%; this obviously impaired Mr. Striebyfs ability to move (R.
136 at 117).

(R. 137 at 318-26).

The court indicated that it had "no

substantial reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version" of the fight
(R, 137 at 321). The court commented on the impairment that Mr.
Strieby displayed in the testimony of defendant.

The court said:

It appears to the Court that Chris Strieby
grabbed Mrs. Strieby, pushed her a number of
occasions [sic]. And it appears to the Court
that she was able to pull away at least a
couple of times. It appears to the Court
that during the scuffle, she was able to push
him away either with her arms or with her leg
or foot on one occasion.
During the fisticuffs, even by the
defendant's version, Chris Strieby swung and
missed on one occasion, which would suggest
some impairment of his physical abilities and
his coordination.
(R. 137 at 323-24).

The court then commented on the evidence of

a cap, a blue cup and spilled liquid which were found next to the
victim's body (R. 136 at 26 41, and 144).

The court said:

And the only rational way that that glass
got to the landing [where the body lay], in
the Court's view, is consistent with what Mr.
[Nash] said. As Chris was pushed on the one
occasion and fell and tumbled, she went up
the stairs and he went into the kitchen and
poured himself a drink. If that occurred,
then there was a reasonable, substantial
cessation in what had started at the door.
There was no physical evidence that Mrs.
Strieby had, other than initially, tried any
vigorous efforts to escape the condo, to
shout, to holler, to seek the assistance of
others. There was no evidence in the record
to suggest that she had used objects of
furniture or anything else in the house to
fend him off or to take any evasive action.
But rather that she went up the stairs and
got the gun at a time when he wasn't in
vigorous, hot pursuit.
(R. 137 at 324-25) (emphasis added).

Based on these findings,

the trial court determined that defendant did not act in selfdefense but did cause
-6-

the death of Chris Strieby under
circumstances of emotional, extreme emotional
disturbance and [the court] finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was not a
reasonable explanation or excuse for such
conduct and concludes accordingly that she
stands guilty of the crime of Manslaughter, a
Second Degree Felony.
(R. 137 at 325-26).
ARGUMENT
THE MAJORITY DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOR FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THAT COURT IN
THIS MATTER.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in this
case stated the correct standard of review but incorrectly
applied it when the majority reversed the decision of the trial
court.

Because this trial was to the bench, the Court of Appeals

correctly stated that the standard of review was that given in
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

That standard is

the "clearly erroneous" standard taken from Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
requires that if the findings (or the trial
court's verdict in a criminal case) are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made, the findings (or verdict) will
be set aside.
Strieby, slip op. at 3.

While this standard was correctly given

in the case, it was incorrectly applied.
The majority stated that the trial court's conclusion
that the victim had gone into the kitchen and poured something to
drink before going up the stairs was clearly erroneous.

The

majority stated M[t]hat this conclusion is not supported by any

evidence in the trial record; it is merely the prosecution's
supposition".

Strieby/ slip op. at 6 (emphasis added).

The

majority then concluded that the trial court had filled a gap in
the evidence with speculation and that the State had not proven
that defendant did not act in self-defense.

Ibid.

As was pointed out by Judge Bench in his concurring and
dissenting opinion, there was no gap in the evidence.

Contrary

to the majority's statement, there is evidence in the trial
record supporting the trial court's finding that the victim had
broken off the confrontation before defendant went up the stairs
and retrieved the gun.

Four times in defendant's own testimony

she stated that Mr. Strieby left her and went into the kitchen
(R. 137 at 242, 243, 245 and 267-68; Addendum B).

The majority

opinion totally ignored defendant's statements when it stated
that there was no evidence in the record to support the trial
court's finding that the victim had discontinued the fight.
Judge Bench's concurring and dissenting opinion
correctly analyzed the evidence presented at trial and correctly
applied the standard of review.

As Judge Bench said:

The trial court concluded that defendant
did not act in self-defense because there was
a "reasonable, substantial cessation" in the
hostilities when Mr. Strieby went into the
kitchen to pour himself a drink. In
reversing this case, my colleagues state that
this finding "is not supported by any
evidence in the trial record; it is merely
the prosecution's supposition." Yet
defendant herself testified that, during the
fight on the stairs, "I kicked him in the
groin. I pushed him, and he went into the
kitchen." Whether he fixed a drink or not, I
believe the evidence supports the trial
court's finding regarding cessation of
hostilities. At that point, given her

relative level of intoxication (another
factual finding), defendant could have done
any number of things to protect herself.
Instead, she went upstairs, picked up a
loaded revolver, and waited for Mr. Strieby.
Under these circumstances, there was a
basis for the trial court to find that
defendant could not have reasonably believed
that shooting Mr. Strieby was necessary to
prevent her own imminent death or serious
bodily injury. I do not believe the court's
finding is clearly erroneous.
Strieby, slip op. at 7-8 (emphasis in original; footnote
omitted).
In the recent case of Sweeney Land Company v. Kimball,
127 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah February 9, 1990), this Court
reversed a panel of the Court of Appeals because that court had
misapplied the Rule 52(a) standard of review.

In that case, the

panel of the Court of Appeals had substituted its judgment about
the credibility of a witness for that of the trial court.

In the

present case, the error of the majority is even more egregious
because the majority has not only substituted its judgment for
that of the trial court, but it also has erroneously denied that
there was any record evidence to support the trial court's
finding.

Defendant's own testimony clearly supports the finding

of the trial court that hostilities ceased before the shooting.
Therefore, the majority erred in determining that the finding was
against the clear weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, this court should grant certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals, which reflects a
substantial departure from the standard of review enunciated in
State v. Walker.

See R. Utah App. P. 46(c).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court grant its petition for writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this :2(/^ day of April, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Neil A. Kaplan and Anneli R. Smith, Attorneys for Defendant,
200 American Savings Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101, this pi- " day of April, 1990.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

*~ /C *i< of t * Court

OPINION
»»wC#*rt*
(For Publication)

v.
Erlene Kay Strieby,

Case No. 890124-CA

Defendant and Appellant•

Third District, Tooele County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys: Neil A. Kaplan and Anneli R. Smith, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Erlene Kay Strieby was convicted of
manslaughter, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989). She appeals her conviction,
claiming that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to justify a conviction of manslaughter. We reverse.
On July 8, 1988, defendant shot her husband, Chris
Strieby, while both were in their condominium in Tooele, Utah.
On the morning of that same day, defendant and Chris argued
briefly while at Chris's father's welding shop. Defendant then
drove to The Eagle's, a local club, where she consumed several
alcoholic drinks.
Later in the afternoon, defendant went to Chris's
father's trailer, which was parked alongside the welding shop,
to take Chris home. He had consumed between one-third and
one-half of a fifth of vodka. They began arguing again.
Defendant tried to slap Chris's face. He grabbed her shirt,

pinned her to the floor, and held her there by the neck for a
few minutes while she struggled. After he released her,
defendant called her friend, Charlotte Gourley, who came to the
trailer and took defendant to the Striebys' condominium.
Defendant then sent Joseph Gruenwald and Kenneth Taylor, young
men temporarily living with the Striebys, to pick Chris up.
The young men dropped him off outside the condominium and
immediately left for Salt Lake City.
Defendants version of what occurred at the condominium
is as follows. When Chris entered the condominium, he
physically attacked defendant and threatened to kill her. He
told defendant, "I am going to kill you, you bitch. You don't
deserve to live." She attempted to leave by the front door,
but he slammed the door shut. They then scuffled in the
entryway and defendant ran upstairs. Chris pursued her and
caught her on the landing, where he grabbed her leg, pulled her
to the floor, and dragged her down the stairs on her back. He
attempted to strike her with his fist while she was still lying
on the stairs. She evaded the strike and kicked him away with
her foot. He then went into the kitchen. At this point,
defendant ran upstairs to their bedroom, took a .357 magnum
from its holster in the closet, and returned to the top of the
stairs. Chris was ascending the stairs, shouting threats and
obscenities. When he reached the landing and was starting up
the second flight, defendant told him to leave. She pled with
him to give her a couple days to pack her belongings and leave,
but he continued to verbally threaten to kill her. Defendant
then fired a single round, which entered Chris's mouth and
lodged in the second cervical vertebrae, instantly killing him.
Defendant was charged with second degree murder. At
trial, she argued that she acted in self-defense. Although the
judge stated that he had no substantial reason to doubt
defendant's testimony that she feared for her life, he
convicted her of manslaughter after a bench trial.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in: (1) finding the evidence sufficient to make a prima facie
case of manslaughter at the close of the State's case in chief;
(2) finding evidence sufficient to convict her of manslaughter;
and (3) ordering restitution. Since we conclude that there was
insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
we do not reach defendant's claim of an improper restitution
order.

INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence
from a bench trial conviction, we note that
the content of Rule 52(a)fs ••clearly
erroneousH standard, imported from the
federal rule, requires that if the
findings (or the trial court's verdict in
a criminal case) are against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, the findings (or
verdict) will be set aside.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); £££ also State
v. Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817, 818 (Utah 1989). This standard of
review is less deferential than that applied in a jury trial
because of the multi-member versus single fact finder, and
requires that the evidence presented not be contrary to the
verdict. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-787 (Utah 1988).
1.

Prima Facie Case

A person commits manslaughter when she or he:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(c) causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct i^s not legally
justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989).
Defendant asserts that because the State failed to prove
the elements of manslaughter during its case in chief, the
court should have granted defendants motion for judgment of
acquittal. She argues that the State was required to, but did
not prove the absence of self-defense, and thus failed to prove
the elements of manslaughter. We disagree.

The interplay between Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1982) and
rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-17(o) (1982)) requires a trial judge to grant a
motion for judgment of acquittal when the prosecution fails to
present enough believable evidence to put the defendant to her
defense. State v. Smith. 675 P.2d,521, 524 (Utah 1983). The
State is required to show some evidence of every element of its
cause of action, or a lesser included offense, to avoid an
unfavorable directed verdict at the close of its case in
chief. However, the State is not required to prove a dearth of
self defense as one of those elements. The Utah Supreme Court
has specifically held that an "[a]bsence of self-defense is not
one of the prima facie elements of homicide." State v. Knoll,
712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985).x
We find at the close of the State's case in chief, there
was enough evidence to set forth all of the statutory elements
of manslaughter. Defendant admitted to causing the death of
Chris Strieby, and at this point in the proceeding, the
evidence presented did not legally justify her actions. We
find the State's evidence sufficient to establish the prima
facie elements of manslaughter and require defendant to proceed*
2.

Verdict

Defendant next argues that she is not guilty of
manslaughter because she was justified in shooting Chris under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978) which states:
[A] person is justified in using force
which is intended or likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury only if he
reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or a third
person, or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.
Defendant maintains that Chris's violent physical attack,
coupled with his threats to kill her, led her to believe that
force was necessary to protect herself from death or serious
1. The court stated, "Self defense is a justification for a
killing and a defense to prosecution." Forcing the prosecution
to prove the absence of self defense would force it to prove a
negative, a burden which the law typically does not impose.
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214.

bodily injury. She testified that Chris's rage and violence
escalated beyond anything she had previously experienced with
him. The trial judge apparently believed defendant's story.
He specifically found that upon arriving at the condominium,
Chris physically attacked defendant, and that given Chris's
••powerful, muscular build,H there was "no substantial doubt
about the reality11 of her fear for her life.
Defendant's account was corroborated by the testimony of
Dr. Mark Vernon Anderson, who treated defendant in the Tooele
Valley Hospital emergency room after the incident on July 9,
1988. Dr. Anderson diagnosed a ruptured disc in defendant's
neck, a fresh rug burn on her left elbow, and a hand shaped
bruise on her left upper arm. She also had a swollen left eye,
a cut on her forehead, and a red mark on the front of her
neck. At trial, Dr. Anderson testified that the ruptured disc
and the rug burn were probably caused by defendant being
dragged down the stairs. He also noted that defendant's
medical history included four previous back surgeries and neck
problems. He opined that being dragged down the stairs put her
at a much higher risk of serious injury than a person with a
••normal" healthy back. Defendant testified that Chris was
aware of her back problems.
Despite this evidence and his own findings, the trial
judge concluded that defendant did not act in self-defense
because (1) defendant was "quicker and more agile given their
relative levels of intoxication," and (2) the presence of a
blue plastic cup on the landing indicated there had been a
•'reasonable, substantial cessation" in hostilities.
There is little, if any, evidence in the record to
support the trial judge's conclusion that Chris's coordination
was impaired by alcohol to the extent that he was not a serious
threat to defendant. The autopsy report showed Chris had a .25
blood alcohol content. Dr. Edwin Steven Sweeney, State Medical
Examiner, examined the body on July 9, 1988. He testified that
a .25 blood alcohol content would strongly affect self control
and judgment, and might affect coordination, but to a lesser
extent. Further, defendant testified Chris prevented her from
fleeing out the front door and caught her as she first ran
upstairs to the landing. Finally, defendant's actual injuries
illustrate that Chris was fully capable of seriously harming
defendant.
The trial court inferred from the presence of a blue
plastic cup on the landing that Chris stopped to fix a drink in

the kitchen. The court agreed with the prosecution that Chris
went into the kitchen and poured something to drink before
following defendant upstairs. This conclusion is not supported
by any evidence in the trial record; it is merely the
prosecution's supposition. A court may not "'make speculative
leap[s] across . . . remaining gap[s]• in the evidence. . . .
Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt" or^fehe^ve^4ict must fail. State v. Harman,
767 P.2d 567, 5^6 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Petree, 659
P.2d 443/ 445 (Ut^h 1983))~r^The State must also prove the
absence of self-defense after it is properly raised. It is not
the defendant's burden to "establish a defense of self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the
evidence." Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214.
All the evidence other than the blue cup indicates that
defendant reasonably believed herself to be in imminent danger
of serious injury or death and that she had, indeed, already
suffered serious injury. The trial court did not doubt her
credibility, but nevertheless engaged in pure speculation about
a cessation of hostilities. While the trial court's
conclusions should be respected, the conviction may not oppose
the weight of the evidence. Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. We find
the court's guilty verdict contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence and, as a result, that the State failed to prove the
elements ol manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reversed,

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I CONCUR:
S'^*^&&*&S?1>'.

1£

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
I fully concur in the main opinion's conclusion that the
State presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of manslaughter. I dissent from the conclusion that the
guilty verdict is contrary to the cflear weight of the evidence.
The main opinion correctly sets forth our standard of
review. In order to upset the trial court's verdict, we must
hold that the court's findings are "clearly erroneous." See
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Although
perhaps less deferential than the standard applied in jury
trials, we should regard the findings as accurate unless the
evidence clearly shows they are in error. See Generally Sweeney
Land Company v. Kimball, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1990).
Determinations regarding credibility especially are left to the
trial court. Xfi.; see also State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (1978) provides that:
A person is justified in threatening or
using force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to defend
himself . . . against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a
person is justified in using force which
is intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if he
reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself . . . .
Defendant was therefore justified in using deadly force only if
(1) she was subject to imminent attack, and (2) she reasonably
believed that deadly force was necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to herself.
The trial court concluded that defendant did not act in
self-defense because there was a "reasonable, substantial
cessation" in the hostilities when Mr. Strieby went into the
kitchen to pour himself a drink. In reversing this case, my
colleagues state that this finding "is not supported by any
evidence in the trial record; it is merely the prosecution's
supposition." Yet defendant herself testified that, during the
fight on the stairs, "I kicked him in the groin. I pushed him,

and he went into the kitchen." Whether he fixed a drink or
not# I believe the evidence supports the trial court's finding
regarding cessation of hostilities. At that point/ given her
relative level of intoxication (another factual finding)/
defendant could have done any number of things to protect
herself. Instead, she went upstairs, picked up a loaded
revolver, and waited for Mr. Strieby.1
Under these circumstances/ there was a basis for the trial
court to find that defendant could not have reasonably believed
that shooting Mr. Strieby was necessary to prevent her own
imminent death or serious bodily injury. I do not believe the
court's finding is clearly erroneous. I would therefore affirm
tha conviction,

Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. One of the witnesses of the earlier fight in the trailer
testified that as defendant was leaving, HShe said as soon as
she got her hands on a gun, he was a dead SOB." In evaluating
all of the evidence, the trial court stated as follows:
There was no physical evidence that
Mrs. Strieby had, other than initially,
tried any vigorous efforts to escape the
condo, to shout, to holler, to seek the
assistance of others. There was no
evidence in the record to suggest that she
had used objects of furniture or anything
else in the house to fend him off or to
take any evasive action. But rather that
she went up the stairs and got the gun at
a time when he wasn't in vigorous, hot
pursuit.
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